Who Are the Houthis and What Do They Want? The GCC War Enters a New Phase

The windows blown out of Aramco’s office in Riyadh on Sunday belonged to a district built to advertise Saudi Arabia’s confidence in its future. The Saudi energy ministry said debris from an attempted attack damaged the building and reported no casualties. The Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted Houthi missiles over the capital. The Houthis claimed the attack. An interception may be a military success. It still leaves a government to explain why people in the middle of its capital are hearing explosions before breakfast. Reuters · Riyadh attack

To understand why missiles from Yemen are reaching Riyadh, begin with two wars. The first began years before Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu ordered strikes on Iran. It was a fight over who would govern Yemen and whether Saudi Arabia could tolerate an armed movement on its southern border. The second began on 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel struck Iran and Tehran retaliated against Israel and across the Gulf. The Houthis have brought the two wars together. They see a chance to widen their power in Yemen by putting pressure on the kingdom at a moment when its partners are already stretched. Reuters · Opening strikes

Who are the Houthis? Rebels who came to govern

The Houthis call themselves Ansar Allah, meaning Partisans of God. They grew out of a Zaydi revivalist movement in northern Yemen. Zaydism is a branch of Shia Islam with a long Yemeni history, distinct from the Twelver tradition predominant in Iran. In Saada, the movement drew strength from resistance to the erosion of Zaydi religious and political influence. Its early leader, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, turned that discontent into a confrontation with the government. Yemeni forces killed him in 2004. His brother Abdul-Malik eventually took command. By 2009, the fighting had already drawn in Saudi Arabia along the border. UK Parliament · Yemen briefing

The rebels became rulers after Yemen’s political transition broke down. In 2014 they took Sana’a with help from forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose government had fought them in Saada. Saudi Arabia led a military intervention in March 2015 to support the internationally recognised government. The alliance with Saleh ended in 2017, when the Houthis killed him after he broke with them. The movement survived both that rupture and years of Saudi-led bombing. It still governs Sana’a and much of northwestern Yemen. Insurgents by origin, de facto rulers in the territory they hold, the Houthis also field an armed force capable of striking far beyond it. Yemen’s internationally recognised government remains their rival. UN · Yemen conflict background

What do they want? Their conduct suggests three aims. At home, they want to preserve their hold on territory, state institutions and revenue. Across the border, they want Saudi Arabia to negotiate with them directly and accept their place in any settlement. Abroad, they want the standing that comes from being able to interrupt a trade route and force larger powers to reckon with them. Their Red Sea campaign, presented as solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, gave them that standing. Their rule at home deserves scrutiny of its own. In September the UN said 73 of its personnel remained arbitrarily detained by Houthi authorities, some since 2021. The movement’s claims to defend people abroad should be read alongside its treatment of those trying to deliver aid inside Yemen. UN Geneva · Aid staff and access

Who started the Gulf war, and who widened it?

The United States and Israel initiated the February war. They launched strikes on Iran on 28 February after indirect US–Iran talks failed to produce a breakthrough. Washington called its campaign Operation Epic Fury. President Trump presented the strikes as a response to a security threat and urged Iranians to challenge their rulers. That is the American administration’s stated case. The sequence of events is clear. Washington and Israel decided to open this round of hostilities. Iran then decided how far its retaliation would reach. Reuters · Opening strikes · CENTCOM · Operation Epic Fury

Iran widened the war to Gulf Arab territory. On 11 March, UN Security Council Resolution 2817 condemned Iranian attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan. The Council determined that those attacks breached international law. Tehran subsequently used pressure on shipping around Hormuz as leverage, while Washington began blockading movements to and from Iranian ports in April. A June interim accord briefly raised hopes of a pause. Fresh exchanges soon put it under strain. By 8 November, President Trump was still speaking of restraint if talks made progress, while the two sides were reporting further maritime incidents. Reuters could not independently confirm those latest reported strikes. UN · Resolution 2817 · Reuters · June interim agreement · Reuters · Hormuz developments

These decisions carry distinct responsibilities. Washington and Israel chose the opening offensive. Tehran chose to extend its retaliation to neighbouring states and use shipping as a means of pressure. The Houthis chose to escalate against Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is responsible for the strikes it conducts in Yemen. The dispute over who opened the larger war cannot settle who fired a particular missile, who authorised a particular air strike or who owes an account to the people beneath it.

Why the guns turned towards Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia and the Houthis had already fought for years. The UN truce of April 2022 reduced cross-border attacks and made diplomacy possible. It expired in October, but a period of relative restraint followed. By December 2023, the UN envoy had secured commitments towards a roadmap covering a nationwide ceasefire, public salaries, oil exports, roads and access through Sana’a airport and Hudaydah port. The roadmap went straight to the economic questions on which armed power in Yemen rests. Whoever collects the revenue and pays the civil service can make a strong claim to govern. UN · April 2022 truce · UN envoy · Yemen roadmap

Early in the Iran war, the Houthis stayed out of direct hostilities with Saudi Arabia. Reuters dates the breakdown of that restraint to July and traces the subsequent escalation through a Houthi advance towards the southern Red Sea in September. In October, a Saudi-backed Yemeni government offensive and Saudi strikes sharpened the confrontation. The Houthis presented their attacks on the kingdom as retaliation for strikes in Yemen. Their choice of targets points to an additional purpose. Pressure on airports, ports and Aramco forces Riyadh to reckon with costs far beyond the border. Reuters reported that an October strike on Riyadh’s international airport killed at least 13 people and wounded more than 300. Pilgrims were among those caught up in it. Reuters · The renewed Saudi front

Iran’s ally, with ambitions of its own

Iranian support has helped the Houthis turn a northern Yemeni insurgency into a force able to launch missiles and drones over long distances and threaten commercial shipping. For Tehran, the relationship extends its reach to the far side of the Arabian Peninsula. It gives Saudi Arabia and the United States another front to consider while Iran exerts pressure around Hormuz. For the Houthis, Iranian assistance provides capabilities they can use to pursue their own aims. Their movement fought Yemeni governments before Tehran became a substantial backer. The degree of Iranian direction behind any particular Houthi operation requires evidence about that operation. Council on Foreign Relations · Iranian support · UK Parliament · Yemen briefing

The geography explains the anxiety in the Gulf. Hormuz is the outlet from the Persian Gulf. Bab el-Mandeb, between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, is the southern entrance to the Red Sea. When Hormuz became dangerous, Saudi Arabia could send crude west by pipeline and load it on the Red Sea coast. Houthi pressure at the southern passage exposed that route for cargoes heading towards Asia. The consequences travel with the ship. Freight and insurance can rise, voyages can lengthen, and buyers in Asia can find themselves paying for a confrontation taking place thousands of miles from their refineries. Reuters · The renewed Saudi front · Council on Foreign Relations · Iranian support

Where Washington stands

The United States is a combatant against Iran, a security partner of Saudi Arabia and an adversary of the Houthis. Washington redesignated Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2025. Two months later, Oman brokered an agreement under which Washington and the Houthis would refrain from attacking one another, including American vessels. Its scope was limited. A deal to spare American shipping could coexist with Houthi attacks on other targets. That distinction helps explain why Riyadh still has to ask what American support will mean in practice. Reuters reported in October that Washington had provided intelligence and targeting assistance after the Saudi crown prince sought military help. A US air campaign on Saudi Arabia’s behalf would be a further decision. US State Department · Ansar Allah designation · Oman · US–Houthi agreement · Reuters · The renewed Saudi front

Saudi Arabia is seeking help elsewhere while keeping diplomatic channels open. AP reported on 8 November that Syria was preparing to send fighters to the Saudi border, according to three officials. Advisers had already deployed to the kingdom, they said, and Syrian fighters had yet to enter Yemen. Riyadh has also pursued talks involving Iran. A frontier deployment can help Saudi Arabia defend its territory. Foreign troops crossing into Yemen would raise the political cost of withdrawal and increase the number of governments whose decisions could prolong the fighting. AP · Syrian deployment plans · Reuters · Riyadh attack

Could Netanyahu’s setback change the Gulf’s future?

Israel’s 27 October election left both Netanyahu and his rival Gadi Eisenkot short of a governing majority. President Isaac Herzog has given Eisenkot the first chance to assemble a coalition. Netanyahu has suffered a political setback. Eisenkot still has to put together a government, and its policy towards Iran will depend on the coalition he can form. A different Israeli government could change the pace of operations against Iran, the latitude it gives Washington in negotiations and the prospects for a more durable ceasefire in Gaza. Any of those changes could reduce the political value the Houthis derive from presenting their campaign as part of a regional struggle. AP · Israeli coalition talks · Council on Foreign Relations · Iranian support

The deeper Saudi problem would survive a change in Jerusalem. The Houthis fought the kingdom years before the current Iran war, and they still have territory, weapons and a claim to power in Yemen. A ceasefire with Iran could lower pressure at Hormuz. A Gaza agreement could deprive the Houthis of part of their public justification for Red Sea attacks. Securing Saudi cities and reopening the road to a Yemeni settlement would still require commitments from the forces that can stop the shooting there. UN · Yemen conflict background · UN envoy · Yemen roadmap

That settlement matters most to people with the least say in the widening war. In Taiz province on Friday, a market was hit. Houthi authorities reported at least 30 dead and blamed Saudi Arabia. Government-aligned authorities blamed the Houthis. AP could verify neither side’s account. The UN estimates that 22.3 million people in Yemen need humanitarian assistance and protection this year. For them, the test of any ceasefire will be whether the road opens, the salary arrives and the market can trade again. Those were the terms Yemen’s negotiators were already discussing in 2023. The war has travelled a great distance since then. Its most urgent business is still there. AP · Taiz market attack · UN · 2026 Yemen humanitarian plan · UN envoy · Yemen roadmap