India Is Selling Its Telecom Inheritance. But Who Really Stands to Gain?

India has arrived at a peculiar moment in its economic history. A nation that speaks confidently of technological sovereignty, digital independence and becoming a global telecommunications power is preparing to dispose of valuable assets belonging to the very public enterprises that helped connect the country. Land, buildings, optical-fibre networks and other infrastructure accumulated over decades are being examined for commercial exploitation. The government describes the exercise as asset monetisation, a respectable financial expression suggesting efficiency and intelligent management of idle resources. Yet behind that terminology lies an uncomfortable question. How did institutions that once represented the reach and ambition of the Indian state become so financially distressed that their accumulated property must now help pay for their survival?

The immediate occasion is a decision announced on 5 November 2026. An inter-ministerial group recommended asset-monetisation proposals exceeding ₹1,100 crore for consideration by a Cabinet-delegated mechanism. The proposals have been linked to surplus properties belonging to Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, the troubled telecommunications company that once occupied an important position in Delhi and Mumbai. The recommendation does not constitute a completed sale. Further approval, valuation and transaction procedures remain necessary. Yet the direction is plain enough. Another portion of the country's public telecommunications inheritance is being prepared for commercial use.

The question concerns much more than the price of a few buildings. It reaches into the history of India's economic development, the responsibilities of successive governments, the spectacular ascent of private telecommunications and the equally remarkable decline of enterprises that once enjoyed the patronage and protection of the state.

From a national achievement to a financial burden

There was a time when obtaining a telephone connection in India required patience, influence and sometimes years of waiting. Telecommunications was regarded as a public utility, controlled by the government and developed through public expenditure. Exchanges were constructed, cables laid and thousands of engineers and technicians dispatched across an enormous country. The work was difficult and frequently unrewarding. Villages, border regions and remote settlements needed connections even where commercial returns were uncertain.

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited was established in October 2000, inheriting much of the operational infrastructure of the government's telecommunications departments. MTNL had been created earlier to serve Delhi and Mumbai. Both possessed valuable real estate, technical institutions, extensive networks and professional expertise. Their property holdings represented decades of public investment.

Liberalisation transformed the industry. Private operators entered with greater commercial flexibility, aggressive pricing, substantial investment and a willingness to respond rapidly to technological change. Mobile telephony expanded at extraordinary speed. The fixed-line telephone lost its central position. Data became increasingly important, and competition shifted towards fourth-generation and fifth-generation networks.

BSNL and MTNL struggled through this transformation. Their problems included technological delays, financial burdens, management weaknesses and the constraints of public ownership. Commercial decisions were frequently entangled with administrative procedures. The companies carried responsibilities that private operators did not necessarily share, while competing for customers whose expectations had changed dramatically. The decline occurred over many years and cannot honestly be attributed to one administration alone. It would be equally dishonest to pretend that the state had no responsibility for institutions whose most consequential decisions remained subject to government authority.

The revival that came late

The government approved a major revival programme for BSNL and MTNL in October 2019. Further support followed in 2022 and 2023. These packages included voluntary retirement schemes, debt restructuring, spectrum allocation, capital support and the monetisation of surplus assets. The 2022 package was valued at approximately ₹1.64 lakh crore, much of it involving spectrum-related support and financial restructuring.

The government was attempting two things at once. It wanted to preserve a public telecommunications enterprise capable of competing in the modern market while extracting financial value from assets no longer considered essential to operations. There is economic logic in this approach. An unused government building deteriorating in a valuable commercial district represents an opportunity cost. Vacant land may produce income through leasing. An optical-fibre network can be shared with other telecommunications operators. Public ownership does not require property to remain commercially unproductive.

The difficulty arises when monetisation becomes a substitute for reform. A property transaction produces a visible receipt. A successful auction can be announced, its proceeds calculated and the result presented as evidence of financial discipline. Repairing the weaknesses that brought an enterprise to its present condition is considerably harder. It requires professional management, accountability, technological competitiveness and freedom from persistent administrative interference. An enterprise that survives by selling assets without repairing its business may eventually exhaust its inheritance while retaining the weaknesses that made the sales necessary.

The government's new commercial arithmetic

In February 2026, the government launched National Monetisation Pipeline 2.0, covering the period from financial year 2025–26 to 2029–30. The programme identifies potential monetisation worth ₹16.72 lakh crore across several infrastructure sectors. Telecommunications accounts for ₹4,800 crore of that projected value. The telecom component envisages leasing approximately 4.4 lakh kilometres of dark fibre and 38 BSNL land parcels. The anticipated value is divided equally between fibre-related revenue and long-term property leases. Under the proposed land-leasing framework, the properties are expected to revert to BSNL when the contractual terms expire.

These distinctions are important. Selling property permanently, leasing it for several decades and charging another company for access to unused network capacity are fundamentally different financial arrangements. Public discussion often gathers all three under the convenient expression of asset monetisation. The government should explain these differences more clearly. What precisely is being transferred? Who will control the property during the contractual period? How are valuations determined? What safeguards protect the public owner if commercial property prices rise substantially? Will the revenue strengthen the telecommunications enterprise, reduce debt, or simply relieve immediate financial pressure?

Parliament was informed in March 2025 that BSNL had generated approximately ₹2,388 crore from land and building monetisation since 2019, up to January 2025. MTNL had generated approximately ₹2,135 crore over the same period. Both companies had also received income from commercial use of core infrastructure, including towers and fibre networks. Clearly, this exercise is neither new nor insignificant. Yet its continuation raises a deeper question about the relationship between public investment and the management of public institutions.

What the government auditor discovered

The Comptroller and Auditor General has identified weaknesses that make the programme particularly troubling. In its 2026 examination of BSNL's tower properties, the auditor found that title deeds for 599 of 1,680 land parcels examined in selected circles were not registered in the company's name. Such deficiencies complicate commercial transactions and expose an enterprise to avoidable legal and financial risks. How could a major public telecommunications company hold strategically important infrastructure without maintaining satisfactory records for so many properties?

BSNL possessed approximately 66,200 towers in March 2025. Only 11,994 were being shared with other operators. Infrastructure-sharing revenue stood at approximately ₹699 crore during 2024–25. These figures do not establish that every remaining tower could profitably be shared. Location, technical suitability and commercial demand determine such possibilities. They nevertheless demonstrate the importance of examining the management of existing infrastructure before declaring the sale of property an indispensable financial remedy.

MTNL and the price of accumulated failure

MTNL's financial condition is especially disturbing. The company has carried enormous liabilities, struggled with declining operational income and defaulted on repayments to major public-sector banks. Its reported net loss for financial year 2025–26 was approximately ₹3,102 crore against total income of about ₹1,469 crore. These numbers explain the government's urgency. An enterprise in such circumstances cannot retain valuable unused property indefinitely while creditors remain unpaid and financial distress deepens.

Nevertheless, the sale of property is a finite remedy. Once an asset has been permanently transferred, the enterprise can no longer derive future benefits from its ownership. If the money received merely postpones another financial emergency, the apparent improvement may prove temporary. India should therefore demand more than an announcement recording the value of assets monetised. The government must demonstrate corresponding improvements in debt, operational performance, customer service and the long-term financial condition of these companies.

The national interest beyond the balance sheet

India cannot assess its public telecommunications infrastructure solely through the commercial standards applied to a private operator. Reliable communications in remote settlements, border districts and difficult terrain have implications for public administration, emergency services, economic opportunity and national security. In regions such as Jammu & Kashmir, Ladakh and the northeastern states, telecommunications can be a matter of considerable public importance. Commercial profitability is relevant, but it cannot be the only consideration.

This does not excuse poor management. Indeed, the strategic responsibilities carried by public telecommunications make competent administration more necessary. The government's substantial investment in BSNL's technological revival suggests that it recognises this obligation. Official figures released in March 2026 recorded the addition of more than 103,000 4G base transceiver stations since 2014. The state has continued to provide spectrum and financial support intended to restore competitiveness. The challenge is to ensure that these investments produce an efficient, dependable and commercially sustainable network.

What must be made public before the next sale

The government should publish a comprehensive register of properties proposed for disposal, indicating their locations, present uses, ownership status, independent valuations and reasons for being classified as surplus. Every significant transaction should be subject to transparent procedures. The method of valuation, identity of the successful bidder, consideration received and contractual safeguards should be disclosed. Long-term leases should contain provisions protecting the public interest against speculative exploitation.

The allocation of proceeds deserves equal scrutiny. Where money is used to reduce debt, the results should be measurable. Where it finances modernisation, the promised improvements should be visible to subscribers. Independent audits should examine these transactions after completion. Parliament should receive periodic reports comparing financial benefits realised against the objectives originally announced. Such requirements are safeguards for property accumulated through public expenditure.

And who will answer for the decline?

India's telecommunications history contains remarkable achievements by both public institutions and private companies. Private investment helped transform a scarce service into an everyday necessity. Public-sector networks established much of the earlier foundation and continue to support important national objectives. It would be unreasonable to insist that every government-owned building must remain permanently untouched. Equally, it would be irresponsible to regard accumulated public property as an inexhaustible reserve for meeting financial emergencies.

The present policy must therefore be judged by the quality of the institutions that emerge after monetisation. If BSNL becomes technologically competitive, MTNL's liabilities are responsibly addressed, customers receive better services and valuable surplus properties generate fair returns, the government will have made a credible case. If the assets disappear while structural failures remain, the accounting achievement will conceal a much more expensive disappointment.

India may have legitimate reasons to monetise its telecom assets. But if the proceeds are exhausted and the enterprises remain broken, who will answer for an inheritance that the country can never recover?